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Abstract: David Kaplan elaborated a so-called two-step method for the analysis of 
indexical expressions. In the first step of the method, the content of indexical 
sentences is determined with respect to a particular collection of contextual pa-
rameters. The second step of the method identifies an actual or counterfactual 
circumstance with respect to which it is possible to ask for the truth values of 
sentence contents. In some cases of language use, however, the two-step method 
cannot be applied in its original form. In fictional discourses, for example, index-
ical sentences seem to shift their content. Truth Perspectivism is a Kaplanian view 
that conceives the phenomenon of content-shift as an effect of perspectival oper-
ators. It is argued in this paper that Truth Perspectivism has some counterintui-
tive consequences. For this reason, an alternative view is proposed that is able to 
explain the underlying mechanism of content-shift in a less controversial way. 
This alternative view is introduced here under the label Meaning Perspectivism.
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1  Semantics for indexical expressions: 
The classical picture 
In his systematic work on the Logic of Demonstratives (LD), David Kaplan argued 
quite persuasively that indexical languages have their own logic that is in many 
important respects remarkably different from the classical logic of the first-order 
predicate calculus. Classical logic and its semantics had considerable difficulties 
in explaining how such expressions as “I,” “here,” or “now” may get different 
values in different contexts. The framework of first-order predicate calculus was 
also unable to account for how these expressions can vary their values when used 
by different agents in the same context. As a consequence of this explanatory 
deficiency, the principles for the truth conditional evaluation of indexical sen-
tences remained rather poorly understood until the late 1980s.
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One of Kaplan’s innovative solutions to this explanatory problem was a sharp 
conceptual distinction between contexts of occurrence and circumstances of eval-
uation. Before we discuss the usefulness and limits of this well-known distinc-
tion, it is important to recall what LD was not designed to do.
Kaplan’s theory belongs to the logical tradition of Frege and Tarski, where 
fragments of natural languages are typically analysed using an appropriately 
constructed model-theoretical semantics. Working in this tradition, and also in-
fluenced by the works of Church and Lewis, Kaplan conceives semantics as an 
essentially formal enterprise. The range of the objects of semantic analysis in 
such enterprises are restricted to sets, possible worlds, and other kinds of ab-
stract entities. This explains why the contingencies of the linguistic activities of 
agents are not represented in the model-theoretic part of LD. And this implies, in 
turn, that LD cannot be extended in a natural way to a pragmatic theory of lan-
guage comprehension and production. Kaplan emphatically remarks in this re-
gard that “logic and semantics are concerned not with the vagaries of actions, but 
with the verities of meanings.”1
So the concept of “context,” similarly to other fundamental concepts of LD, 
should also not be seen as denoting concrete situations of language use. Contexts 
are thought of instead as minimal collections of parameters which are needed to 
determine the semantic contents of indexical expressions. Such collections are 
represented by quintuples of the form <a, t, l, w, g>, where a is an agent, t is a 
point of time, l is a location, w is a possible state of the world, and g is a (possibly 
partial) variable assignment function defined on the salient entities of w at t and 
l. Given this model-theoretic setting, the content of the contextual occurrences of 
expressions can be determined in a formally uniform way. For example, the se-
mantic content of the formal counterpart of “I” in context c at w is ca, the agent of 
c.2 Similarly, the content of of the formal counterpart of “here” in c at w is cl, the 
location of c. Content determination follows technically the same pattern in all 
cases of individual indexical expressions. At the level of sentences, LD identifies 
contents with structured propositions. The content of the formal counterpart of 
an indexical sentence S in context c at w is the proposition P which contains as 
constituents one or more of ca, ct, and cl.
Circumstances of evaluation enter the picture when contents are already 
fixed. They can be regarded as world-time pairs <w, t>, which have the role of as-
signing truth values to sentence contents. World-time pairs may be occasionally 
1 See Kaplan (1989b: 584–585).
2 From here on the reference to the assignment function g will be omitted for the sake of 
 simplicity.
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supplemented by other parameters. This is so because truth values depend gen-
erally on the shiftable parameters of the context. Worlds and points of times may 
be shifted by the standard modal and temporal operators. If the target fragment 
of LD contains other shiftable parameters that are also relevant for truth evalua-
tion, then the formal stucture of circumstances can be enriched with them. Per-
haps locations such as “in Europe” or “in the town” may be conceived in some 
linguistic environments as operators or quasi-operators that are able to shift sen-
tential contents in the way just mentioned. Fortunately, the question need not be 
settled here. We should only note that there is some flexibility in defining the 
concept “circumstance of evaluation” in LD.
As the foregoing overwiev indicates, Kaplan’s theory is based on a so-called 
two-step method. In the first step of the method indexicals are interpreted with 
respect to a particular collection of relevant contextual parameters. At the level of 
individual expressions, the interpretation process determinates subsentential 
contents, whereas at the level of sentences, it determines propositions that are 
composed from these subsentential contents. Then the second step of the method 
identifies an actual or counterfactual circumstance with respect to which it is pos-
sible to ask for the truth values of propositions.3
A characteristic feature of this method is that the first step, in a certain sense, 
constrains the second one. It is a simple enough matter to observe that each con-
text of occurrence is associated with privileged world and time parameters. In 
normal cases of communication, the priviliged world and time of truth evaluation 
are always our own actual world and time. As an illustration, consider a context 
c  containing me as agent parameter. Imagine that the following sentence type 
occurs in c:
(1)  I know the solution to the problem.
According to the first step of Kaplan’s method, the semantic content of the first 
person pronoun “I” in c is ca, the agent of c. Thus the sentence type (1) expresses 
the proposition that the agent of c knows the solution to the problem. Since it may 
quite naturally be supposed that the privileged world (and time) of c is our actual 
world (and time), (1) can be evaluated by the second step as true, if and only if I, 
Z.V., know the solution to the problem.
This seems to be a correct result, both formally and informally. The actual 
world loses its privileged position only in cases where operators act on sentence 
contents:
3 See, for example, Perry and Israel (1996).
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(2)  Necessarily, I know the solution to the problem.
In (2), the privileged world of the context c cannot be simply the actual world, 
since the modal operator modifies radically the truth conditions of the sentence 
type “I know the solution to the problem,” so that it is true if, and only if it is true 
at all possible world states.4
It is an interesting question whether the same criterion may be applied to the 
first step of the method. That is, are there any operators that are able to shift the 
conventional content of indexicals? Kaplan denies the existence of such opera-
tors. On his view, indexicals are directly referential expressions that can never be 
detached from the content-determining parameters of their actual context of oc-
currence. We can test the correctness of this claim by applying an artificial opera-
tor to the example (1):5
(3)  In some contexts it is true that I know the solution to the problem.
If the operator “In some contexts it is true that” can shift the content of “I” in the 
embedded sentence, then Kaplan’s claim was incorrect. It seems, however, that 
the operator is not able to produce such kind of content shift. In order for (3) to be 
a grammatically acceptable sentence, the first person pronoun in it would have to 
refer to an agent of an arbitrary context. Then the proposition expressed by (3) 
would contain as constituent the agent of this arbitrary context. But it is hard to 
see how the pronoun “I” could refer to such a shifted agent in its actual context of 
occurrence. Or, seen from the reverse angle, it is hard to understand how the di-
rectly referential “I” could fail to refer to the agent of its actual context of occur-
rence. We might try other operators, but (3) appears to provide some prima facie 
evidence in favor of the Kaplanian view, which denies the operator-shiftability of 
contents.6
This does not mean that we should take the Kaplanian picture of indexicals 
to be accurate in all of its details. In the last two decades, the conceptual distinc-
tion between contexts of occurrence and circumstances of evaluation has become 
a standard part of the orthodoxy of formal semantics. At the same time, it has 
4 Of course, the phrase “all possible worlds” means here all possible worlds relative to a par-
ticular model-theoretic structure.
5 Cf. Kaplan (1989a: 510).
6 Is should be noted here that the relation between evidence and hypotheses in linguistics has 
been recently acknowledged as a complicated problem. For an analysis of the role of linguistic 
evidence in LD, see Vecsey (2010). A general overview of this field of research is to be found in 
Kertész and Rákosi (2012).
Brought to you by | Georg-August Universität
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/9/15 9:48 PM
Indexicals, fiction, and perspective   113
been discovered that LD in its original form is incomplete because it is not capa-
ble of modeling a certain set of natural language phenomena. There are un-
common discourse situations, for example, where indexical contents seem to be 
systematically shifted without the involvement and intervention of sentential op-
erators. Everyday cases of free content-shifting include telephone answering ma-
chine messages, direct quotations, written notes, and similar kinds of communi-
cative exchanges. A striking common feature of these cases is that they allow for 
indexicals to refer to objects that lie outside of their actual context of occurrence.7
How should the principles of the Kaplanian two-step method be modified in 
order to accomodate LD to the anomalous behavior of these discourse situations? 
This is the question I try to answer in the following three sections by focusing on 
content-shifting phenomena as they appear in fictional discourses.
2  Indexicals in fictional discourse
Beyond telephone answering machine messages, fictional discourses provide 
perhaps the most straightforward and most spectacular instances of free content- 
shift. Before we begin to evaluate two extant proposals for the modification of LD, 
it may be useful to provide a brief overview of the semantic status of indexicals in 
fictions. As a concrete example, let us take an actor playing the role of Caesar 
in the play Caesar and Cleopatra written by George Bernard Shaw. Con sider the 
following utterance on the stage from Act II:
(4)  I am a general myself.
For the purposes of a formal analysis, we must, of course, disregard the contin-
gent properties of such a sentence token as (4). We should not take into consider-
ation that (4) is an active performance of a declarative speech act. Nor should we 
be concerned with the particular communicative intention of the actor. The audi-
ence may react in several ways to the speech act, but it is also beside the point. 
What is interesting is instead the content-determining relation that holds be-
tween an abstract sequence of contextual parameters and the occurrence of the 
formal counterpart of the sentence I am a general myself in a context constructed 
from that sequence. From this we see immediately that in the context of occurence 
of (4) the content of “I” is not determined by the actual agent of that context. So, 
7 As far as I know, the debate on the semantic properties of such messages was opened by 
Sidelle (1991).
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instead of having the default content ca in c at w, “I” must be associated with an-
other agent. Quite obviously, the actor of the play does not predicates of himself 
that he is a general. The most plausible supposition in this situation is that the 
content of the first person pronoun in (4) has to be determined by the character of 
the play, that is, by Caesar. Concerning the mechanism of content determination, 
we can then establish that there occurs a shift from ca to cap, where cap denotes the 
contextually relevant agent of the play.
Here lurks a problem, however. One might object that the content-shift men-
tioned above cannot take place, because there is a significant difference in onto-
logical status between the actor and the character of the play. While the actor is a 
person, Caesar is an abstract entity of a certain sort, and as such it cannot take 
over the semantic role of an agent. Therefore, Caesar (whoever he or it may be) 
cannot be formally represented in LD as uttering a self-referential indexical sen-
tence. This potential objection has its origins in the debate between realism and 
anti-realism over fictional characters and their properties.8 Realists often argue 
that fictional characters are abstract entities the existence of which depends 
on the storytelling activities of their creators. Fictional characters are thought to 
supervene on mental facts and this supervenience relation creates a semantic 
continuity between natural languages and languages of fiction. So it is not illegit-
imate to claim that Caesar has several properties, and one of them is the property 
of uttering a sentence about himself. Anti-realists do not contend that fictional 
characters are created by the intentional acts of their authors, but they think of 
these characters as nonexistent objects. On this account, Caesar may have indi-
viduating properties, but he/it cannot have existence entailing ones. This restric-
tion would involve certain technical difficulties in LD, but I think nonexistent 
objects can be made compatible with Kaplan’s original ideas. Introducing a do-
main of quantification for nonexistent objects would be a promising step in this 
direction. So even if we have anti-realist inclinations, we may say that “Caesar” 
denotes always an agent in LD, independently from its ontological status, and 
this is enough to acknowledge the shift from ca to cap in our example above.
What we have seen in (4) may be generalized to many other cases of first- 
person sentences occuring in spoken and sometimes even in written fictional 
 discourse. When the content of the narrative “I,” which is often the case, is not 
the author of the novel or the short story, but an imaginary agent, a content-shift 
happens necessarily. Other indexical expressions are also able to produce the 
phenomenon of free content-shift. Embedded in a fictional discourse, the content 
8 For an overview of this debate see Priest (2011).
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of “now” can be shifted from ct to an appropriately characterized fictional point of 
time ctf . The same holds ceteris paribus for “here,” “today” and “yesterday.”
From this overview it can be safely concluded that the main deficiency of LD 
is that it lacks a general rule or principle that could explain the underlying mech-
anism of free content-shifting. The crucial question is then whether the Kapla-
nian two-step method has a consistent extension to fictional discourses.
3  Truth perspectivism and its problems
Two proposals have been made recently that could answer positively that ques-
tion. Both of these proposals maintain that in order to assign truth values to prop-
ositions in fictional discourses we should make use of the idea of perspectivity. 
Because of this, I will apply for them the common label Truth Perspectivism.
In one of his recent papers, Stefano Predelli elaborated a view that may be 
regarded as a consistent extension of Kaplan’s theory.9 Predelli accepts the pri-
mary building blocks of the formal architecture of LD. He agrees with Kaplan that 
contexts can be defined formally as quintuples of parameters, and that proposi-
tional contents are determined on the basis of ordered pairs consisting of sen-
tence types and contexts. In accordance with the two-step method, Predelli also 
thinks that truth values for indexical propositions are determined by world-time 
pairs.
At first glance, Predelli’s explanation of the anomalous behavior of indexi-
cals in fictional texts is rather surprising. In particular, he explains the truth 
 value differences between non-fictional and fictional indexical sentences in terms 
of circumstance-shift. Let us come back for a moment to our earlier example from 
the play Caesar and Cleopatra:
(4)  I am a general myself. (Repeated)
One might be inclined to think that (4) is a paradigmatic instance of free 
 content-shift, because the first person pronoun in it can and should not refer to 
the actor of the play. Predelli proposes to consider an alternative view. What if 
we  evaluate fictional sentences from their own fictional perspective? One way 
to do this is to represent these sentences with a prefix roughly in the following 
manner:10
9 See Predelli (1997).
10 The idea for this arises from Lewis (1978).
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(5)  It is true in the play Caesar and Cleopatra that I am a general myself.
Two remarks must be made in this regard. First, the prefix “It is true in the play 
x that” is supposed to remain invisible in the surface syntax. It appears only in 
the analysis of the logical form of sentences. Second, “It is true in the play x that” 
is a standard intensional operator that may act on the world and time parameters 
of an embedded sentence. Kaplan has already noted that such operators can in-
teract with worlds and time points since the content of indexical sentences is 
not always necessarily associated with a privileged world (and time point). Thus, 
it seems that (5) provides a correct analysis of (4) in that it makes explicit that 
the  sentence should be evaluated from the perspective of the play Caesar and 
Cleopatra.
Predelli does not completely agree with this approach. Indeed, seen from 
the  point of view of LD, the prefix strategy appears a bit counterintuitive. The 
syntactic structure of (5) is different from the syntactic structure of (4), and it 
is fairly unlikely that such a difference would not imply a corresponding differ-
ence in the semantic content of these sentences. The prefix strategy claims, how-
ever, that there is no difference in the semantic structure of (5) and (4). Hence, 
they must express the same proposition. This assumption cannot be taken for 
granted.
The strenght of Predelli’s own approach lies in avoiding the counterintuitive 
consequences of the prefix strategy. His version of Truth Perspectivism does not 
apply any prefixes, and thus leaves the syntactic structure of (4) intact. On the 
other hand, it is not entirely clear how the fictionality of (4) could be derived 
 without using some kind of syntactic transformation. Perhaps a solution can be 
found if we conceive the utterance of (4) as generating a contextual change. Pre-
delli maintains that sentences in fictional discourse should be assotiated with 
modified contexts and these modified contexts contain shifted world parameters. 
According to this approach, the sentence type “I am a general myself” is evalu-
ated with respect to the quintuple <a, t, l, w*, g>, where w* denotes the world 
of the performance of the play Caesar and Cleopatra. What has been changed is 
only the world parameter of the original context of (4). The modified quintuple 
contains the world w*, which plays now the privileged world of that context. 
Since the content of the first person pronoun is Caesar at w*, (4) can be evaluated 
as true.
At first blush, Predelli’s approach may seem to provide a simple and elegant 
solution to our initial problem. But a moment’s reflection reveals that it is also a 
bit counterintuitive. Let us suppose that sentences used in fictional discourse in-
duce contextual changes. But if all contextual parameters are kept fixed, and the 
world parameters are the only ones that are shifted, then Predelli would have to 
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explain how these shifts are performed. The only course open to him would be to 
argue that worlds are shifted by hidden operators, but, as we have seen above, 
this strategy cannot be right.11
In their 2003 paper, Eros Corazza and Mark Whitsey elaborated a second 
 version of Truth Perspectivism.12 Corazza and Whitsey agree with Predelli 
that   indexical expressions in fictional discourse behave in accordance with 
the  core principles of LD. However, their positions differ significantly with re-
spect  to emphasis on ontology. Corazza and Whitsey classify themselves as 
 anti-realists and think that fictional characters do not have real existence. 
And so  they argue that in certain cases the content of an indexical expression 
in  a  fictional text or in a performance of a play may be determined by empty 
 parameters.
Applied to our example, this position has the following two consequences. 
First, it implies that the fictional character “Caesar” should be thought of as a 
non-existent object. As I have already suggested, such a view is not especially 
problematical in itself. From the point of view of formal semantics, the ontologi-
cal status of fictional characters is not of primary importance. Second, we have 
to take into consideration that non-existent objects can only be represented by 
empty contextual parameters. If we take it granted that Caesar is a non-existent 
object, and assume further that our example is a paradigmatic instance of free 
content-shift, then we must also claim that the content of the first person pro-
noun in (4) is determined by an empty agent parameter. Can such a non-trivial 
claim be supported?
Corazza and Whitsey are aware of a potential problem that may arise from the 
postulation of empty parameters. Let us imagine that the following sentence is 
uttered by an actor in a play:
(6)  I am here now.
According to the view under discussion, the content of “I,” “here,” and “now” 
must be evaluated in (6) with respect to an empty contextual parameter. More 
precisely, all three expressions are supposed to be connected to the one and the 
same empty parameter, and that is controversial. How could the content of differ-
ent types of indexicals be determined by the same parameter?
11 At several points in his later works, Predelli argues that parameter shift is governed by speak-
er’s intentions. This is a more reasonable proposal, but it has its own obvious limitations. See, for 
example, Predelli (2002, 2005) and, for a critique, Stevens (2009).
12 See Corazza and Whitsey (2003).
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On Corazza and Whitsey’s view, this does not pose an insurmountable prob-
lem if we recognize that the content of indexicals may be enriched with addi-
tional information in fictional discourses. For example, (6) may be conceived as 
expressing the descriptive proposition that there is an agent a who is located at 
a place l at a time point t. The descriptive proposition represents merely the re-
flexive truth condition of (6), and so it is free from existential commitment.13 In 
grasping this truth condition, we understand what linguistic content the sen-
tence type “I am here now” is able to convey in its fictional environment. This is 
different from the incremental truth condition, which can be grasped by language 
users only if “I am here now” occurs in a non-fictional environment. Given that 
descriptive propositions do not involve objects in the traditional way, there would 
be nothing wrong in saying that the sentential content of (6) is determined by 
empty parameters.
The same seems to hold for (4). Following the above line of thought, Corazza 
and Whitsey might say that the sentence “I am a general myself” expresses the 
descriptive proposition that there is an agent a who ascribes himself the property 
of being a general. For this proposition to be true with respect to the fictional 
world of Caesar and Cleopatra, the agent a need not exist. It is enough if the con-
tent of the first person pronoun in (4) is determined by an empty contextual pa-
rameter. In our case, the empty parameter is, of course, the fictional character 
Caesar.
Here we see again a world-centered explanation of free content-shift. Though, 
on their view, the phenomenon of content-shift is an inherent contextual mecha-
nism of the language game of fiction, Corazza and Whitsey can hardly deny that 
their proposal makes essential use of shifted world parameters. The discrimin-
ation between different kinds of truth conditions is a telling sign: while they 
overtly assotiate fictional worlds with reflexive truth conditions, their arguments 
suggest implicitly that incremental truth conditions can be associated only with 
our actual world.
This is, hovewer, only the first controversial aspect of Corazza and Whitsey’s 
version of Truth Perspectivism. The second difficulty is that even if it were ac-
cepted that reflexive truth conditions have to be involved in the evaluation of 
 indexical sentences, the proposal would be incomplete, because it says too little, 
if anything, about the underlying principles of content-shifting.
In the following section, I will outline an alternative view that tries to over-
come the shortcomings of Truth Perspectivism.
13 For more details, see Perry (2001).
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4  Meaning perspectivism as an alternative
If the preceding analysis is correct, Truth Perspectivism may be regarded as an 
untenable position, since it attempts to explain the phenomenon of content-shift 
in terms of shifted circumstances of evaluation.
It has been occasionally stated in the relevant literature that the meaning of 
indexicals is in some sense perspectival. Kaplan also remarked, in passing, that 
the content of indexical sentences is always dependent on the speaker’s perspec-
tive.14 In following this suggestion, we can probably examine the hidden mechan-
isms of content-shift in a methodologically more fruitful way than Truth Perspec-
tivism. Indexicals are context-sensitive expressions; and we may add that they 
are also potentially perspective-sensitive.15
I think there is no serious technical obstacle to introducing the concept 
of  perspective in the stock of primitives of LD. The idea promoted here is that 
 perspective, seen as a semantic primitive, can serve the function of a non-
standard  contextual parameter. The resulting theory may be called Meaning 
 Perspectivism.16
It is advisable to employ the most economic procedure and define the per-
spective parameter as a shifting effect on the standard Kaplanian context tuples. 
Let us say that in fictional discourses a collection of contextual parameters takes 
the form of <a→af , t→tf , l→lf , w=wf >, where the subscript f denotes the perspective of 
the fiction F, and the symbol → represents an optional shift between a standard 
and a nonstandard parameter. Note that in fictional contexts the agent, time, and 
location parameters may be optionally shifted, but at a minimum, one of them 
must be shifted.17 In contrast, the world parameter is always obligatorily shifted 
to the world parameter of the fiction. We should not mistakenly interpret this last 
requirement. Though the privileged world of the context of an indexical sentence 
is obligatorily shifted to the world of the fiction, it cannot be shifted alone. The 
reason for this is rather simple. The shift from w to wf would not be able to explain 
in itself why a particular indexical expression is forced to alter its actual content 
in a fictional context. Something more is needed. In order to arrive at a complete 
14 See, for example, Kaplan (1989a: 492–495, 520).
15 In the literature on predicates of personal taste, context-sensitivity and perspective- 
sensitivity  are sometimes succesfully combined. For example, Stephenson (2007) argues that 
there is a phonologically silent but syntactically realized perspectival component in such sen-
tences as “Licorice is tasty.” The role of the perspectival parameter consists in modifying the ex-
pressed content of these sentences.
16 Schaffer (2011) uses the label Meaning Perspectivalism in a similar sense.
17 Note that even such strange contexts as <a→af , t, l, w=wf > are in principle possible in certain 
inconvenient fictions.
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representation of fictional contexts, every single content-shift must be formally 
represented.
Since sentence contents are already enriched with a perspectival element, 
Meaning Perspectivism leaves the rest of the Kaplanian model intact. Circum-
stances of evaluation can be thought of as world-time pairs in the same way as in 
the original version of LD. It may also be assumed that the privileged world with 
respect to which sentence contents are evaluated is our actual world.
Let us check the explanatory power of Meaning Perspectivism on our main 
example (4). First, the sentence type “I am a general myself” has to be interpreted 
with respect to the context tuple <a→af , t, l, w=wf >, where af is Caesar, and wf is the 
fictional world of Caesar and Cleopatra. On this interpretation, “I am a general 
myself” belongs to the fictional world of Caesar and Cleopatra, and thus it ex-
presses the proposition that Caesar himself is a general. Second, the expressed 
proposition has to be evaluated relative to the actual world (and time). Since it is 
a plain fact that Caesar is a general in the fictional world of the play, that proposi-
tion can be taken to be true.18
The result seems satisfactory. We have shown that a paradigmatical fictional 
sentence can be evaluated as true in its actual context of occurrence, if one 
or more of its subsentential constituents shift freely their semantic content. Noth-
ing has been said so far, however, about what motivates the process of free 
 content-shift.
It must be stressed again that perspectivity, as we have defined it, is a 
non-standard contextual parameter. It is not a semantic object of the usual kind. 
Rather, it should be conceived as a content-shift indicator. When language users 
recognize the typical signs of fictional discourses, they recognize also the pres-
ence of a content-shift indicator. They come to realize that some elements of the 
discourse require a perspectival interpretation. But, in general, it is a contingent 
matter that the sentence “I am a general myself” gets interpreted from the fic-
tional perspective of Caesar and Cleopatra. Language users may fail to respond 
properly to the perspective of the play because of many reasons. To mention 
just one of these: if the play is being performed by a street theatre group, an in-
attentive passer-by could interpret the sentence in question as if it were part of a 
non-fictional discourse. Being a fictional sentence is, in this sense, a response- 
dependent property.
18 As it can be observed, one minor difference from the Kaplanian method is that in the actual 
context of (4) the privileged world is now wf , but, in spite of this, the proposition expressed by (4) 
has to be evaluated with respect to our actual world. If we want to regard fictive texts as part of 
our world, this modification seems unavoidable.
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In the vast majority of cases, however, content-shift indicators perform their 
proper function undisturbed: they modify the contents of individual expressions 
and so help to avoid misinterpretations of indexical sentences embedded in fic-
tional discourse. If sentence contents get enriched and modified by perspectival 
parameters, then the system of LD should mirror this fact. We may then reason-
ably infer that what sets off the process of free content-shifting within formal 
models of indexicality is the quest for semantic correctness, and in the end, the 
quest for validity and truth.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have focused solely on the phenomenon of free content-shift as 
it appears in fictional discourse. It would be interesting to see whether the ap-
proach developed here can be extended to other cases of shifted indexicals.
Recorded messages are also among the obvious examples of free content- 
shift. The message “I am not at home now” can often be heard on answering 
 machines. Followers of Meaning Perspectivism would say that in this case the 
content of the indexical “now” has to be represented formally as t=tr, where t 
 denotes the time point of the recording of the message and tr denotes the time 
point of the receiving of the message. The symbol “=” indicates that an obligatory 
shift must be performed between these distinct time points. Thus the problem 
posed by answering machine messages can be solved in the same way and with 
much the same result as the problem posed by fictional discourses. In both cases, 
the correct interpretation of an indexical sentence requires the introduction of a 
specific perspectival element into the formal representation of the context. It is 
very likely that other instances of shifted indexicals can be treated along similar 
lines.
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